The Press ID Badge extension was originally designed to support decentralized identities for authors and journalists, enabling them to establish clear ownership of newsworthy content. Beyond content attribution, this extension also functions as a decentralized Single Sign-On (SSO) system—providing a secure alternative to traditional username-password authentication.
The public/ directory in this repository serves as a testbed for:
npm i -g @verifiedpress/verifiedpress-cli to issue, inspect, and validate credentials aligned with VerifiedPress.org (or used on your own verification platform).
This sandbox is ideal for testing across multiple origins, simulating credential issuance and selective disclosure, and validating login logic without coupling to centralized identity providers.php -S localhost:8082 -t .
Using the sample decentralized identity (DiD) in did.json, which is did:web:localhost:8082 to enter for the DID in the popup.
Upon saving the DiD is populated in the index.php page (if the DID field doesn’t populate, just reload the browser),






now can you can process the DiD and Signature for your login logic?


with an updated verification confirmation,



NOTE: in the .well-known/did.json, the ~JWK and~ Public Key has been replaced with a public link for the public_key.pem certificate, as the openssl_verify will fail when the public_key is passed as a string or decoded from a JWK, but works when file_get_contents(




DUE TO PERMISSION ISSUES, SAFARI USERS MUST COPY AND PASTE THE PRUVATE KEY FOR SIGNING Running from localhost, copy the private key,
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
then paste in the extension private key field,

then press Sign Message button,
The user must register with your service by providing their public DID and identity public URL which contains their public JWK for verification.
You must provide a message that you want to user to sign with their local private key and provide the signature of the message to your service so you can verify if they really sign using the public identity URL of the JWK, if they infact did sign with he corresponding private key, then they will pass verification. If they sign with a different private key, to simulate an imposter, then the verification will fail as shown above.
Effectively eliminating the userid-password-2fa model in the traditional sense, the userid is the public DID and the password is the signature of a message or metadata string provided by the service for the user to sign using their local private key.
Verification is perform on publicly accessible identity documents that were provided during a registration process.
The user is required to provide a publically accessible URL for the DiD identity document with the public_key.pem file. If the user does not have a public website, the easiest option is to create a free github.com repository and an assoicated gitpage for that repository, then provide the gitpage URL to the service. Only the public_key.pem is available on git pages, keeping the private key used for signing messages locally and safe. DO NOT UPLOAD THE PRIVATE KEY TO GITHUB!
Keeping your private key on your mobile device is not secure, instead using a JSON Web Token (JWT) that is signed using your private key, the JWT can be authenticated against the public key. The payload for the JWT will contain your DID and Expiry at a minimum. See JSON Web Token tool for more information.
ipconfig | ifconfig
results,
IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.1.18
php -S 192.168.1.18:8080 -t .

cd ../tools/jwk
npm install
npm start
a new file name jwk has been created.
the token will be loaded automatically. In a production environment, you will need to copy and past the token.



An example of direct DOM manipulation of the index.php (public facing page) from content.js (extension file),
in the manifest.json,
...
"content_scripts": [
{
"matches": [
"<all_urls>"
],
"js": [
"scripts/content.js"
],
"run_at": "document_start"
}
],
...
in the index.php (publicly hosted or using php -S localhost:8080 -t index.php),
<p>
<label for="userid"><b>User ID</b></label>
<!-- setting the field readonly, thereby only the plugin can update the field -->
<input id="userid" name="userid" type="text" readonly required>
</p>
<script>
window.onload = function() {
window.postMessage({command: "GET_USER_PARAMS"}, "*");
}
</script>
in the content.js,
<script>
window.addEventListener("message", async function (event) {
if (event.source !== window) return;
if (!event.data || typeof event.data !== "object") return;
if (event.data.command === "GET_USER_PARAMS") {
// user credentials are saved in chrome storage datastore name credentials
chrome.storage.sync.get("credentials").then(function(res, err){
// content.js ONLY can manipulate the index.php DOM directly
document.getElementById("userid").value = res.credentials.userid;
}
}
}
</script>
Use Cases for READONLY INPUT field
| Component | Execution Context | Access to index.php DOM |
Window Access | Chrome API Access | Messaging Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
index.php |
Public Web Page | ✅ Full access | ✅ Yes | ❌ None | 🟡 Receives postMessage from content.js |
content.js |
Injected into index.php |
✅ Full access | ✅ Yes | ⚠️ Limited | 🔄 Bi-directional with background.js and popup.js |
background.js |
Extension Service Context | ❌ No access | ❌ No | ✅ Full | 🔄 Routing & persistent logic |
popup.js |
Runs in popup.html |
❌ No access | ✅ Yes | ⚠️ Limited | 🔄 Receives messages from background.js |
Though popup.js can send messages to content.js via the window.postMessage().
index.php ←→ content.js ←→ background.js ←→ popup.js
↑ ↑ ↓
postMessage sendMessage sendMessage
The Press ID Badge extension provides the mechanics to sign a message with a private key and then set a DOM object id with that signature. The minimum configuration for a public facing page with Press ID Badge extension are one input or hidden fields (with value attribute) with the assigned id’s of “did”, case-sensitive, and a message listener for the “SIGNATURE_READY” event.
The “did” element represents the Decentralized Identification obtain from the .well-know/did.json document and saved in chrome.storage, the signature is sent back to the public facing page via the message event of “SIGNATURE_READY”.
<input type="text" id="did">
create a message listener,
window.addEventListener("message", async function (e) {
if (!e.data || typeof e.data !== "object") return;
console.log(e);
if (e.data.type === "SIGNATURE_READY") {
const { signature } = e.data;
console.log(signature);
// process the signature
document.getElementById("proof").value = signature.signature;
}
});
Absolutely—here’s an expanded comparison of Technologies by Phase from Web1 through Web9, including speculative future layers like quantum computing and bio-digital convergence:
| Web Version | Era | Core Technologies |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-Web | ~1978–1990 | BBS, dial-up, Usenet, forums, early chatrooms |
| Web1 | ~1990–2004 | HTML, HTTP, static websites, basic hyperlinks |
| Web2 | ~2004–2020 | JavaScript, AJAX, REST APIs, social platforms, mobile apps |
| Web3 | ~2020–2025 | Blockchain, smart contracts, DIDs, Verifiable Credentials, IPFS, crypto wallets |
| Web4 | Emerging | AI/ML, IoT, AR/VR, edge computing, brain–computer interfaces |
| Web5 | Visionary | DIDs, Decentralized Web Nodes (DWNs), JSON-LD, identity wallets, no tokens |
| Web6 | Speculative | Autonomous AI agents, synthetic identities, self-evolving protocols, emotional UX |
| Web7 | Conceptual | Quantum computing, quantum-safe encryption, entangled communication |
| Web8 | Futuristic | DNA-based data storage, bio-digital interfaces, neural mesh networks |
| Web9 | Post-human | Digital consciousness, synthetic life, virtual civilizations, AI governance |
🧠 Highlights of the Future Webs:
IMPORTANT
The public and private keys provided in this repository are strictly for evaluation and development purposes only.
These keys are not secure and must not be used in any production, public-facing, or identity-critical environment.Any misuse may expose your application to serious cryptographic vulnerabilities.
🛡️ For real-world deployments, always generate fresh key pairs using industry-approved methods and manage them securely.